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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout its history,' the National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation (NCAA) 2 has exercised various forms of control over ama-
teur collegiate sports.3 As a self-regulatory organization,' the
NCAA has included, among its controls, regulations concerning the
televising of college football games.6 Because these regulations do
1. The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a private nonprofit association organ-
ized in 1905. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (W.D. Okla. 1982). "The
fundamental purpose of the NCAA is to preserve distinctively amateur athletics as part of
the academic program of the nation's institutions of higher education." Note, Tackling In-
tercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust, Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655, 656-57 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
2. "The NCAA has approximately 850 voting members. The regular members are clas-
sified into separate divisions to reflect differences in size and scope of their athletic pro-
grams. Division I includes 276 colleges with major athletic programs; in this group only 187
play intercollegiate football." NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2954 (1984).
3. The NCAA "has adopted and promulgated playing rules, standards of amateurism,
standards for academic eligibility, regulations concerning recruitment of athletes, and rules
governing the size of athletic squads and coaching staffs .... With the exception of foot-
ball, the NCAA has not undertaken any regulation of the televising of the athletic events."
NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2954.
4. Note, supra note 1, at 655.
5. Based on a series of National Opinion Research Center Studies, which concluded
that televised college football decreased live gate attendance for games that were not tele-
vised, the NCAA instituted a program of controls on televised college football games in
1953. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1283. For the 1982-1985 seasons, the NCAA, on behalf of its
member institutions, granted the right to telecast 14 football games per season to ABC and
CBS.
The "television plan" required the two networks to "schedule appearances for at least
82 different member institutions during each 2-year period." NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2957. The
plan entitled each member institution to a maximum of four national and six total appear-
ances. Id. These restrictions on television appearances only applied to schools in Division I.
NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1290. "Division II and III schools are allowed unlimited freedom in
televising their regular season games." Id.
In return for their television rights, the networks agreed to pay a "minimum aggregate
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not allow member institutions the freedom to negotiate their own
television contracts,6 the Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma and the University of Georgia Athletic Association
7
brought an action challenging the NCAA television regulatory pro-
gram as violative of the Sherman Act.8 The United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma held that, under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act, the television plan was illegal both per
se and under the rule of reason, because it constituted a group
boycott as well as a horizontal agreement among the NCAA's
member institutions to fix prices and restrict output.9
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's holding that the television plan constituted both illegal
price fixing and restriction of output;10 however, it reversed the
district court's determination that the NCAA regulations consti-
compensation" of $131,750.00 for the four-year period. Each member institution receives
compensation based on a recommended fee that a representative of the NCAA sets. The
amount of this fee depends on the geographical extent of the telecast and the school's divi-
sion. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2956. "[Clompetitive bidding for game rights is not contemplated
under the . . . contracts." NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1292. The NCAA also awarded the Tur-
ner Broadcasting System (TBS) the exclusive right to cablecast NCAA football games for a
minimum aggregate fee of $17,696,000. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2956 n.9.
6. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1149 (10th Cir. 1983).
7. Both the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia are members of the
College Football Association (CFA). The CFA consists of major football conferences and
independents, including "the Big 8, Southeastern, Southwestern, Atlantic Coast and West-
ern Athletic Conferences-and major football-playing independents such as Notre Dame,
Penn State, Pittsburgh, and the service academies." NCAA, 546 F. Supp. at 1285. "The
original purpose of the CFA, which is itself a member of NCAA, was to lobby and promote
the interests of major football playing schools within the NCAA structure." Id.
Unhappy with the restrictive NCAA television plan and the power of nonmajor and
nonplaying football schools within the NCAA structure, the CFA negotiated a television
agreement of its own with NBC in 1981. The television agreement never came to fruition,
because the NCAA announced that it would take disciplinary action against any school that
complied with it. In addition, "[t]he NCAA made it clear that sanctions would not be lim-
ited to the football programs of CFA members, but would apply to other sports as well."
NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2957.
8. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982)). "Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta
of free enterprise." United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). "The Sherman
Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition as the rule of trade." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
9. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276 (1982). The district court also held
that the NCAA exercised monopoly power over the market of college football television in
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. Both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme
Court, however, "found it unnecessary to reach this issue." NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2957-58
n.12.
10. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983).
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tuted a group boycott." On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the
United States held, affirmed: Although horizontal restraints on
competition that are potentially essential to the availability of a
product are not illegal per se, the NCAA restrictions on televised
college football violate section 1 of the Sherman Act under the rule
of reason. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
The NCAA holding manifests the Supreme Court's effective
"blurring" of the per se rule/rule of reason dichotomy.' As the
Court stated: "[T]here is often no bright line separating per se
from Rule of Reason analysis."' "Rather than presenting two radi-
cally different antitrust tests, the Burger Court's use of the per se
and rule of reason tests emphasizes similar concerns.""' Instead of
resorting to a "labeling process," the Court now will assess a chal-
lenged restraint's potential impact on competition before applying
either antitrust standard. 5 In other words, if the Court initially
determines that a restraint is potentially procompetitive, it will
judge it under'the rule of reason rather than the formalistic per se
rule.
The Court's "quick look" at the restraint's potential competi-
tive impact is the functional approach to antitrust analysis.'0
Under this approach, the Court legitimizes its use of the per se
rule, because it utilizes the rule of reason when antitrust defen-
dants demonstrate that a challenged restraint is "arguably ancil-
lary to an efficiency enhancing arrangement.' 7 Although the Court
has traditionally deemed price fixing illegal per se, in the present
case, it analyzed the NCAA television plan under the rule of rea-
son. Because the very nature of amateur collegiate athletics de-
mands a "certain degree of cooperation,"' 8 the Court determined
that the restraint was at least potentially procompetitive.
Yet, the Court specifically limited its rule of reason analysis.
11. Id.
12. The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REv. 87, 255 (1984) (recognizing that
the Supreme Court has blurred these boundaries "in recent years").
13. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2962 n.26.
14. Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust Litigation By "Facial Examination" of Restraints:
The Burger Court and the Per Se-Rule of Reason Distinction, 60 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2
(1984).
15. Id. at 7.
16. Note, Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society: Supreme Court Refuses to Im-
munize Doctors Against Sting of Sherman Act Section 1, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1203, 1212-15
(contrasting the functional approach with the formalistic approach in determining whether
a restraint deserves per se treatment).
17. Id. at 1212.
18. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2969.
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First, the Court ignored the industry's need for cooperation once it
made its threshold determination that the restraint was potentially
procompetitive. Instead, it properly focused its inquiry on the
challenged restraint's actual impact on competition.19 Moreover,
the Court stated that once it finds that a restraint is actually an-
ticompetitive, it will declare it to be in violation of the Sherman
Act without an elaborate market power analysis: the sine qua non
of traditional rule of reason analysis.2 0 Because functional analysis
forces courts to analyze more restraints under the comparatively
complicated rule of reason, the Court's adoption of the limited rule
of reason appears to be an effort to allay the fear that functional
analysis will further burden the judiciary.
II. THE SHERMAN ACT: POLICY AND STANDARDS
At first glance, section 1 of the Sherman Act appears relatively
straightforward; it provides: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal."'1 If the Act's language is taken literally, every
contract that restrains competition would be declared illegal.
Surely, the Sherman Act "cannot mean what it says."22 Congress
could not have intended the courts to declare unlawful "every"
contract that restrains competition.2 3 Recognizing the practical dif-
ficulty of applying the text of the Act literally, Justice Brandeis
noted that "the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be
determined by so simple a test. . . .Every agreement concerning
trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of
their very essence. 2 The intent of the Sherman Act, therefore, is
to proscribe only unreasonable restraints of trade.
19. Id. at 2962; see Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1978).
20. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2965.
Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the
evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct. For example, while
the Court has spoken of a "per se" rule against tying arrangements, it has also
recognized that tying may have procompetitive justifications that make it inap-
propriate to condemn without considerable market analysis.
Id. at 2962 n.26 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984)).
21. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982)).
22. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687 (1978).
23. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982) (citing
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898)).
24. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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Since its formulation in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,25
courts have judged most restraints under the rule of reason.2"
Under the rule of reason, a court must determine "whether the re-
straint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. 2 7 In making this inquiry, courts tradi-
tionally have focused on whether the defendant has market
power-the power to control prices and exclude competition.2 8 The
principal advantage of rule of reason analysis is the judicial flexi-
bility it affords;29 rather than summarily invalidating restraints,
the presiding court can "determine the legality of a practice on the
basis of the particular factual context." ' In exchange for this flexi-
bility, however, courts have had to engage in the complex analysis
of market power.31 "A rule of reason inquiry is . . . wide open in
terms of proof. The court admits virtually any evidence concerning
the purpose, history, or economic impact of a challenged
restraint.""2
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that certain
restraints are illegal per se; therefore, application of the rule of
reason analysis is inappropriate.3 3 These agreements or practices
conclusively are presumed to be unreasonable because of their per-
nicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue. 4
25. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Supreme Court in Standard Oil stated that "in every case
where it is claimed that an act or acts are in violation of the [Sherman Act] the rule of
reason, in the light of the principles of law and the public policy which the act embodies,
must be applied." Id. at 66.
26. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982). But cf. infra
note 30 (discussing use of the per se rule for traditionally proscribed restraints).
27. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Factors to be con-
sidered include the characteristics of the industry in question, the condition of the industry
before and after the imposition of the restraint, the nature and effect of the restraint, and
the reason for adopting the particular restraint. Id. "This is not because a good intention
will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences." Id.; see also Ari-
zona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982).
28. The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1, 260 (1984).
29. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
30. Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 802, 809 (1981) (footnote
omitted).
31. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). Market power analysis
is "an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history
of the industry involved, as well as related industries."
32. Brunet, supra note 14, at 12 (footnote omitted).
33. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
34. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). "In applying these
rigid rules, the Court has consistently rejected the notion that naked restraints of trade are
to be tolerated because they are well intended or because they are allegedly developed to
1985]
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Restraints that historically have been held to be illegal per se in-
clude price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and tying
arrangements.
3 5
The policy behind the application of the per se rule is twofold.
First, it represents an attempt to provide stability in the market-
place; the per se rule's clear delineation of the proscriptions of the
Sherman Act benefits businessmen in their market decisions."
Second, because the only issue is the existence of the restraint, ap-
plication of the per se rule frees a court from a "complicated and
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the in-
dustry involved in an effort to determine whether a particular re-
straint has been unreasonable. 3 7 Consequently, the per se rule as-
sumes the illegality of the restraint without regard to the market
power of the defendant.3 8 Antitrust litigation in per se cases is
markedly different from litigation in rule of reason cases:
A per se designation makes inadmissible reasonableness justifi-
cations supporting a restraint and, accordingly, acts as a rule of
evidence. Once the plaintiff proves the existence of a restraint
meriting per se treatment, a defendant may either rebut the
plaintiff's prima facie case or raise those few antitrust defenses
increase competition." United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (citing, e.g.,
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 146-47 (1966); United States v. Ma-
sonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)).
A court, however, only will hold a restraint illegal per se if it has had considerable experi-
ence with the industry in question. Topco, 405 U.S. at 607; see also White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) ("We do not know enough of the economic and
business stuff out of which these [horizontal territorial] arrangements emerge .... ").
35. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (price fixing);
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1982) (division of markets); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycott); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangement); United States v. McKesson & Rob-
bins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956) (price fixing); Kiefter-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,
340 U.S. 211 (1951) (price fixing); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947) (tying arrangement); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)
(price fixing); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (price fixing);
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) (price fixing); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1898) (division of
markets).
36. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). "Without the per se
rules, businessmen would be left with little to aid them in predicting in any particular case
what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act." United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972).
37. In justifying the application of the per se rule, the Supreme Court in Northern Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 2, 5 (1957) described the rule of reason as mandating "an
inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken."
38. See Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of
the Chicago School, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 319, 322.
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unrelated to the restraint's putative procompetitive considera-
tions. The many issues accompanying a rule of reason trial are
eliminated from a per se case. In per se litigation the expendi-
ture of attorneys' fees and judicial resources is considerably less
than in complicated rule of reason trials.8 9
Therefore, the possibility that the presiding court might decide an
antitrust case differently under the rule of reason is irrelevant in
the application of the per se rule.40
III. ECONOMIC REALITIES AND THE APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN
ACT
Until 1972, the Supreme Court unequivocally and formalisti-
cally applied the per se rule to its traditional proscriptions. 4 1 The
Court's view of its institutional role in antitrust analysis was that
Congress had not endowed the judiciary with the freedom to con-
sider the reasonableness of these restraints.42 In no uncertain
terms, the Supreme Court had stated that engaging in rule of rea-
son analysis when application of the per se rule is mandated would
lead to the emasculation of the Sherman Act.43
In 1972, however, the Supreme Court's view of the per se rule
and its perception of its institutional role in antitrust analysis be-
gan to change with its decision in United States v. Topco Associ-
ates.44 Although the majority" held that the horizontal restraints
on a regional supermarket association were illegal per se, Chief
Justice Burger questioned the application of the per se rule in the
39. Brunet, supra note 14, at 12 (footnote omitted).
40. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 n.16 (1982) (quoting
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972)).
41. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
42. "Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular price-
fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive .... If such a shift is to be made,
it must be done by Congress." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-
22 (1940); accord United States v. Topco Assocs., 495 U.S. 596, 611 (1972).
43. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). "In that
event the Sherman Act would soon be emasculated; its philosophy would be supplanted by
one which is wholly alien to a system of free competition; it would not be the charter of
freedom which its framers intended." Id.
44. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
45. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Douglas, Bren-
nan, Stewart, and White joined. Id. at 597. One reason for the present Court's relaxation of
the per se rule may be simply that Justices Stevens and O'Connor have replaced Justices
Douglas and Stewart. Also, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion hardly endorsed the
Court's application of the per se rule; rather, he viewed the per se rule as'nothing more than'
a fait accompli. Id. at 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Furthermore, Justices Powell and
Rehniquist took no part in the decision. Id. at 612.
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absence of a judicial inquiry into the economic realities of the su-
permarket industry.""
Chief Justice Burger explained that the horizontal restraints
were necessary for Topco to be able to compete with the national
chains.'7 In conjunction with this point, the Chief Justice noted
that the challenged restraints only affected intrabrand as opposed
to interbrand competition. Therefore, the restraints potentially
could be procompetitive and reasonably consistent with the Sher-
man Act's policy of promoting competition.'
Given the potentially procompetitive effects of the restraints,
Chief Justice Burger charged that the majority had abdicated its
role of "carrying out the meaning of the law" by summarily apply-
ing the per se rule." Chief Justice Burger, in essence, opted for the
functional-as opposed to the formalistic-approach to choosing
between the per se rule and the rule of reason. 0 Rather than
blindly applying the per se rule, the Chief Justice argued that
before applying either the per se rule or the rule of reason, the
Court should assess the potential economic impact of challenged
restraints. 1 Thus, if the Court determines that a restraint is po-
tentially procompetitive, it should apply the rule of reason rather
than the per se rule.
In a series of cases subsequent to Chief Justice Burger's dis-
senting opinion in Topco, the Court began to implement the func-
tional approach to the per se rule and the rule of reason. In Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 2 the Supreme Court
overruled its decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.53
that vertical restrictions on retail locations are illegal per se. Jus-
tice Powell,5' writing for the majority, emphasized that the eco-
nomic realities of industry must dominate the Court's antitrust
46. Id. at 620, 622 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 624.
48. Id. at 613-14. Intrabrand competition is rivalry between sellers of the same brand;
interbrand competition is rivalry with sellers of other brands.
49. Id. at 621-22.
50. Note, supra note 16. "Under [the functional] approach, unless a restraint is shown
to be arguably ancillary to an efficiency enhancing arrangement, it is conclusively presumed
unreasonable under section 1." Id. at 1212. "Under [the] formalistic approach, a defendant
must show the challenged activity does not fit into one of [the absolutely] prohibited catego-
ries in order to avoid a finding of per se illegality." Id. at 1214.
51. Topco, 405 U.S. at 621-22, 624.
52. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
53. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
54. Neither Justice Powell, who wrote the majority opinion, nor Justice Rehniquist,
who joined in that opinion, took part in the decision in Topco.
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analysis, because the Sherman Act "aims at substance." 55 Accord-
ing to the majority, vertical restraints, which affect only intrabrand
competition, should be examined under the rule of reason, because
they may promote interbrand competition.5 6 In contrast to its une-
quivocal and vigorous application of the per se rule in previous
cases, the Court concluded that any "departure from the rule-of-
reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect
rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing. ' 57 Given this new
posture, Justice White understandably viewed the majority opin-
ion as an erosion of the per se rule.58
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,59 the Supreme Court fur-
ther proved that it no longer would blindly apply the per se rule.
Expanding Continental T. V.'s functional approach, the Court indi-
cated that it would review the practical economic and noneconomic
considerations facing noncommercial industries when determining
which antitrust standard to apply to a challenged restraint. It
stated that the "public service aspect [of an industry] may require
that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a [per
sel violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated dif-
ferently. '6 0 Nevertheless, in National Society of Professional En-
gineers v. United States,61 the Court clearly indicated that its ap-
plication of either standard would focus on the competitive impact
of the restraint.
The Court continued to utilize the functional analysis in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS."s Instead of formalistically applying
the per se rule to blanket licenses issued for copyrighted musical
composition at fixed prices, the Court chose to apply the rule of
reason after reviewing the substance of the restraint. The Court
asked whether the purpose of the blanket licenses "facially ap-
pear[ed] to be one that would always or almost always tend to re-
strict competition . . . or instead one designed to 'increase eco-
55. Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 46-47 (quoting Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344, 360, 377 (1933)). Vertical restraints are restrictive agreements between
manufacturers and dealers. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 18 (1978). Horizontal re-
straints are restrictive agreements between economic entities in the same market. Id. at 17.
56. See Continental TV., 433 U.S. at 51-52.
57. Id. at 58-59. The Court even suggested that the application of the per se rule could
be detrimental. Id. at 57 n.26.
58. See id. at 70 (White, J., concurring).
59. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
60. Id. at 788-89 n.17. For a full discussion of this case, see Note, The End of Fee
Schedules: The Sherman Act Applies to Lawyers Also, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 464 (1976).
61. 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
62. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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nomic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less,
competitive.'"63 Despite its acknowledgment that the blanket li-
censes constituted price fixing,64 the Court concluded that, because
"the challenged practice may have [had] redeeming competitive
virtues," the per se rule was inapplicable . 5 The Court's "clear di-
rection was to focus on anticompetitive effect in all antitrust cases
as a methodology used to decide whether to apply a per se or rule
of reason approach."66
The Supreme Court's initial inquiry into the potential compet-
itive qualities of a restraint before applying the per se rule or the
rule of reason also is apparent in the only two cases since Topco in
which the Court has clearly applied the per se rule. 7 In Catalano,
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.,68 competing beer distributors agreed to
discontinue selling beer to retailers on credit. The Court applied
the per se rule, because the distributors were unable to proffer "a
procompetitive justification for [their] horizontal agreement to fix
credit."'69 Consistent with the functional approach, the Court ex-
plained that the per se rule applies to restraints that entail "an
obvious risk of anticompetitive impact with no apparent poten-
tially redeeming value."
'7 0
In the second case, the controversial Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Society7' decision, the Supreme Court applied the
per se rule to an agreement among competing doctors to establish
a maximum fee schedule for patients that sponsoring insurance
carriers insured. Although commentators have criticized the
Court's opinion as "wooden" and "mechanical, 71 2 the Court suffi-
ciently utilized functional analysis to legitimize its use of the per se
rule.7 3 "It is apparent that the Maricopa Court conducted a 'facial'
examination of the competitive impact of the alleged restraint and
found it extremely likely to be anticompetitive." 4
After evaluating the defendant's arguments, the Maricopa
63. Id. at 19-20 (citations omitted).
64. See id. at 23.
65. Id. at 13-21; see also Gerhart, supra note 38, at 335-36.
66. Brunet, supra note 14, at 15.
67. See Sims, Maricopa: Are the Professions Different, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 177, 182
(1983).
68. 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
69. Id. at 646 n.8.
70. Id. at 649 (emphasis added).
71. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
72. Gerhart, supra note 38, at 344.
73. See Sims, supra note 67, at 183; Note, supra note 16, at 1223-26, 1228.
74. Brunet, supra note 14, at 20.
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Court stated: "Even when the respondents are given every benefit
of the doubt, the limited record in this case is not inconsistent
with the presumption that the respondents' agreements will not
significantly enhance competition. ' 7  Thus, having made the
threshold determination that the maximum fee schedule was not
potentially procompetitive, the Court legitimately was able to hold
the restraints illegal per se.
IV. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS AND THE LIMITED RULE OF REASON: A
Two-STEP INQUIRY
The Supreme Court's decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents
76
is simply an extension of its analysis in preceding antitrust cases.
First, true to the Court's recent emphasis on functional analysis
since Chief Justice Burger's dissent iri Topco,7 7 the majority fo-
cused its inquiry on the economic realities of the industry of ama-
teur collegiate athletics to determine which antitrust standard to
apply. In deciding to apply the rule of reason rather than the per
se rule, the majority conceded that the NCAA television plan con-
stituted horizontal price fixing and output limitation. 78 The major-
ity concluded that the rule of reason was the appropriate standard,
because horizontal restraints on competition are essential to the
availability of amateur collegiate athletics and are thereby poten-
tially procompetitive 9 It noted that the NCAA plays a vital role
in both preserving the character of college football and enhancing
its availability. The restraints were therefore potentially procom-
petitive and merited consideration under the rule of reason.8
Second, the NCAA majority stated that under either standard
75. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982).
76. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
77. 405 U.S. 596, 613 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see supra notes 52-75 and ac-
companying text.
78. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2959-60. These conclusions arose from two characteristics of
the television plan. First, the plan set the price so that member institutions could not com-
pete with one another on the basis of price or kind of television rights that can be offered to
broadcasters. Id. at 2959. Second, the plan places an artificial ceiling on the number of foot-
ball games that can be televised by the broadcasters and viewed by consumers. Id. at 2959-
60.
79. Id. at 2953. This is because "rules affecting such matters as the size of the field, the
number of players on a team, and the extent to which physical violence is to be encouraged
or proscribed, all must be agreed upon, and all restrain the manner in which institutions
compete." Id. at 2961. In addition, the Court pointed out that cooperation is necessary to
preserve the uniqueness of the "product," college football. The requirements that the "ath-
letes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like" differentiate the
product. Id.
80. See id. at 2961.
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its inquiry was limited to a determination of the television plan's
impact on competition."' Nevertheless, in language that echoed the
per se rule, the majority described the television plan's restrictions
on price and output as "paradigmatic examples of restraints of
trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.
8 2
This apparent inconsistency is due to the Court's adoption of
the limited rule of reason.83 In its application of this standard, the
Court noted that the NCAA television plan had "a significant po-
tential for anticompetitive effects."84 The Court concluded that the
record "indicate[d] that this potential ha[d] been realized," be-
cause the plan had "the effect of reducing the importance of con-
sumer preference.""
The significance of the NCAA Court's approach is that the
Court declined to engage in the traditional rule of reason analysis
of market power.86 In answering the NCAA's allegation that it
lacked market power, the Court stated that, "[a]s a matter of law,
the absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked re-
striction on price or output," and that the television plan's "naked
restraint on price and output requires some competitive justifica-
tion even in the absence of a detailed market analysis." ' In es-
sence, the Court has shifted the burden of proof to the antitrust
defendant to show the competitive effect of the restraint. Thus, the
Court can avoid engaging in the complicated analysis of market
power if the defendant is unable to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged restraint is actually procompetitive.
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, accused the majority
of misinterpreting the Court's decision in National Society of Pro-
fessional Engineers v. United States,"s thereby unduly restricting
its inquiry to purely commercial considerations. 9 He claimed that
the majority should have considered "the NCAA's fundamental
policy of preserving amateurism and integrating athletics and edu-
81. Id. at 2962.
82. Id. at 2964 (citation omitted).
83. See generally Clanton, The FTC and the Professions, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 209, 217
(1983)(characterizing the limited rule of reason as "essentially a burden-shifting device").
84. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2962 (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 2963-64. One of the aspects of the plan that seemed to bother the majority
most was the fact that all member institutions within the same class received the exact same
compensation for the broadcast rights to their games regardless of consumer demand to see
the games. Id.; The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, supra note 12, at 258.
86. See The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, supra note 12, at 258.
87. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2965 (footnote omitted).
88. 435 U.S. 679 (1978); see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
89. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2977-79 (White, J., dissenting).
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cation" 90 in its rule of reason analysis.91 Justice White, citing Con-
tinental T. V..,92 further argued that the television plan passed
"muster under the Rule of Reason," because it promoted inter-
brand competition.
9 3
Answering Justice White's first argument, the majority stated
that the television plan did not "fit into the same mold as do rules
defining the conditions of the contest, the eligibility of partici-
pants, or the manner in which members of [the NCAA] shall share
the responsibilities and benefits of the total venture. 9 4 Further-
more, the "NCAA's argument that its television plan [was] neces-
sary to protect live attendance [was] not based on a desire to
maintain the integrity of college football . . . .,9 Rather, it was
premised on the notion-unsupported by the rule of reason-that
competition itself is unreasonable.9 6
With respect to Justice White's second argument, the NCAA
majority answered that the television plan was not procompetitive.
Unlike the television retail market in Continental T.V., the NCAA
television plan could not promote interbrand competition, because
"broadcasting rights to college football constitute a unique prod-
uct. '97 Moreover, the television plan neither increased output nor
reduced the price of television games.9 8 Therefore, because the tel-
evision plan proved to be anticompetitive, the majority held that it
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act under the rule of reason.
The majority's holding, however, appears to be limited to the
specific restrictions in the television plan before the Court. The
majority took great care to distinguish the television plan's hori-
zontal restrictions from those that were held valid under the rule
of reason in Broadway Music, Inc. v. CBS.9 The majority empha-
sized that, unlike the NCAA television plan, the blanket licensing
agreement in Broadway Music placed no limit "on the volume that
might be sold in the entire market and each individual remained
90. Id. at 2973.
91. Id. at 2971-73, 2977-79.
92. 433 U.S. at 54-57.
93. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2976 (White, J., dissenting).
94. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2969. See generally Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th
Cir. 1977) (applying the rule of reason to the NCAA's restriction on the number of football
coaches each team may employ).
95. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2969.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2968 ("[T]here is no need for collective action in order to enable the product
to compete against its nonexistent competitors.").
98. Id. at 2967-71.
99. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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free to sell his own [product] without restraint."1 0 This distinction
implies that a NCAA television plan that did not limit the number
of games televised and that allowed member institutions to negoti-
ate individually would be valid under the rule of reason.
V. United States v. Topco Associates REVISITED
In an attempt to facilitate competition with the larger national
and regional chains, Topco Associates, a cooperative association of
twenty-five small- and medium-sized regional supermarket chains
formulated the horizontal restraints that the majority held illegal
per se in Topco.' 10 The association used private-label products to
achieve cost economies in the purchasing, transportation, ware-
housing, promotion, and advertising of its products.
102
Private-label products are distinguished from other
brandname products "in that they are sold at a limited number of
easily ascertainable stores."'0 3 To foster this distinction, Topco is-
sued to its members the territorial licenses at issue before the Su-
preme Court.'04 These licenses promoted the exclusivity of the as-
sociation's product in much the same way that the NCAA
television plan ensured the exclusivity of college football broad-
casts; by limiting a market area or broadcast schedule to one seller
of a given product, demand for that product is increased for that
individual seller.
In judging the territorial license under the two-pronged test of
NCAA, one first must determine which antitrust standard to ap-
ply. This inquiry focuses on whether the challenged restraint is po-
tentially procompetitive. Although the horizontal division of mar-
kets once would have been deemed illegal per se, the specific
factual context of the restraint in the supermarket industry now
merits consideration under the rule of reason. As with the NCAA
television plan, the challenged restraint was necessary for the
availability of the product: "There was no such thing as a Topco
line of products until [the] cooperative was formed."'01 5 The pur-
pose of forming the association and setting the private-label prod-
ucts was to compete with the larger national and regional chains.
As Topco's answer stated: "Private label merchandising is a way of
100. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2968.
101. Topco, 405 U.S. at 598.
102. See id. at 599 n.3.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 601-02.
105. Id. at 613 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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economic life in the food retailing industry, and exclusivity is the
essence of a private label program; without exclusivity, a private
label would not be private."' 0 6 Therefore, by allowing regional su-
permarkets to compete with the private label merchandising of the
national chains, Topco's territorial licenses were potentially
procompetitive.
Under the rule of reason, as it is applied in NCAA, a court
only may consider the challenged restraint's impact on competi-
tion. Moreover, if the antitrust defendant is unable to demonstrate
that the restraint is actually anticompetitive a court now may
make this inquiry without engaging in an elaborate analysis of
market power. By allowing courts to declare restraints illegal under
the rule of reason without regard to market power once they deter-
mine that those restraints are anticompetitive, the Supreme Court
has answered the Topco majority's primary fear of entering into
rule of reason analysis. The Topco Court concluded that, because
judges are not trained in economics, the judiciary lacks the institu-
tional capacity to "analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of
competing interests and the endless data that would surely be
brought to bear on such decisions. "107
Because Topco's territorial licenses appear to be actually
procompetitive, they likely would pass antitrust muster. As a result
of the territorial licenses and the private-label products, "Topco
members [were] frequently in as strong a competitive position in
their respective areas as any other chain."' 08 As a practical matter,
Topco's territorial licenses had substantially the same effect on
competition as the tactics that the national chains used in market-
ing their private-label products. 09 In his dissent, Chief Justice
Burger explained the similarities between Topco's private-label
program and those of the national chains:
The national chains market their own private-label prod-
ucts, and these products are available nowhere else than in
stores of those chains. The stores of any one chain, of course, do
not engage in price competition with each other with respect to
their chain's private-label brands, and no serious suggestion
could be made that the Sherman Act requires otherwise. I fail to
see any difference whatsoever in the economic effect of the
Topco arrangement for the marketing of Topco-brand products
106. Id. at 604.
107. Id. at 611-12.
108. Id. at 600.
109. Id. at 623 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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and the methods used by the national chains in marketing their
private-label brands."'
Moreover, as the district court noted, the territorial licenses posi-
tively promoted competition in the supermarket and produced
lower costs for the consumer.11' Therefore, as the trial judge con-
cluded, blindly applying the per se rule "would substantially di-
minish competition in the supermarket field.""'
In the words of Senator Sherman, the Sherman Act sought
"'only to prevent and control combinations made with a view to
prevent competition ... [or to] increase the profits of the pro-
ducer at the cost of the consumer.'-"s Thus, given the Supreme
Court's recent emphasis on these policies through its adoption of
the functional approach to antitrust analysis, the challenged re-
straints in Topco would appear to survive the two-pronged test of
NCAA. As the Chief Justice pointed out in discussing the validity
of Topco's tactics as compared with the tactics of the national
chains: "The controlling consideration . . . should be that in
neither case is the policy of the Sherman Act offended, for the
practices in both cases work to the benefit . . . of the consuming
public.""'
VI. COLLEGE FOOTBALL TELEVISION: A RETURN TO THE SHERMAN
ACT
The Supreme Court's recent emphasis on functional analysis
in determining which antitrust standard to apply to a challenged
restraint has blurred the dichotomy between the per se rule and
the rule of reason. Yet, the emphasis is justified given the Sherman
Act's policy of promoting competition." 5 Although the Court con-
clusively presumed that restraints such as price fixing, division of
markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements violated the
Sherman Act," 6 the present Court first will assess the potential
competitive qualities of a restraint before applying either antitrust
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. United States v. Topco Assocs., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
112. Id. at 1043.
113. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 620-21 (1972) (citing 21 CONG. REC.
2457, 2460 (1890)).
114. Id. at 623 n.11 (Burger, C.J. dissenting).
115. See supra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
116. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (division of markets); Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycotts); Northern Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States,'356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangements); United States v. Socony-Vac-
uum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing).
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standard. 117
Judge Bork,118 the FTC,119 and the Reagan Justice Depart-
ment 20 all have advocated this approach, because it legitimizes the
process and makes "antitrust a rational, proconsumer policy once
more."1 21 Rather than blindly applying the per se rule, as the ma-
jority did in Topco, the Court now may make a more realistic de-
termination of a restraint's competitive effect under the rule of
reason if the restraint appears to be at least potentially procompe-
titive. Although cases like Catalano and Maricopa indicate that
the Court has not abrogated the per se rule, the cases do manifest
a significant narrowing of the rule because of their threshold in-
quiry into the competitiveness of the challenged restraints. Be-
cause functional analysis "requires identification of procompetitive
and anticompetitive efficiencies, it is very unlikely that its employ-
ment would result in an undesirable knee-jerk application of a per
se rule." '22
Moreover, the NCAA approach makes this preliminary inquiry
and the subsequent rule of reason analysis easier for courts like the
Topco majority to accept, because the Topco majority feared that
entering into functional analysis-thus limiting the Court's use of
the per se rule-would "leave courts free to ramble through the
wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible ap-
proach." 2 3 As one commentator noted, the Court's approach seems
to indicate "that it will accept slightly abbreviated versions of rule
of reason analysis when deleterious effects on the market can be
discerned through a quick look at the restraints." 24 Thus, the
Court responded to the Topco majority's fear of the complexity of
market power analysis 2 ' by adopting the Justice Department's
117. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (tying arrange-
ments); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (price fixing); National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (group boycotts); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (division of markets). "Hyde centered
on the tying of anesthesiology to hospital services. The Court, though reaffirming its per se
condemnation of tying, nevertheless engaged in a detailed market-power inquiry, . . . and
thereby continued its trend away from condemning tying with little or no inquiry into mar-
ket power." The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, supra note 12, at 256 n.6.
118. R. BORK, supra note 55, at 287.
119. Clanton, supra note 83.
120. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 6-7, NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S.
Ct. 2948 (1984).
121. R. BORK, supra note 55, at 287.
122. Brunet, supra note 14, at 27-28.
123. Topco, 405 U.S. at 609-10 n.10.
124. The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, supra note 12, at 256.
125. "The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic
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proffered approach to rule of reason analysis: "[U]nless the con-
trols have some countervailing procompetitive justification, they
should be deemed unlawful regardless of whether petitioner has
substantial market power." ' 6 In other words, if the antitrust de-
fendant is unable to demonstrate that the challenged restraint is
actually procompetitive, the Court will invalidate the restraint
without entering into market power analysis. The Court, however,
left open the question of whether it will continue to examine mar-
ket power if the defendant is able to prove that the restraint is
procompetitive.
In NCAA, the Court found that, under the television plan: (1)
the fees paid to individual schools for broadcast rights were unre-
sponsive to consumer preference; (2) the networks were paying ex-
cessive fees for these rights; and (3) the number of college football
games was artificially restricted.' 27 Yet, in the few months since
the Court's decision enabled football-playing universities to negoti-
ate individually with the networks, the free market has changed
drastically the college football horizon. ABC and CBS paid $42.5
million less in broadcast fees in 1984 than they paid in 1983.128
Consequently, both networks were able to make a "profit on their
college [football] packages this year-something they [had not]
been doing under their respective NCAA pacts."' 29 In turn, each
problems. Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one
sector of the economy against promotion of competition in another sector is one important
reason we have formulated per se rules." Topco, 405 U.S. at 609-10 (footnote omitted); The
Supreme Court, 1983 Term, supra note 12, at 262-64.
126. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2965-66 n.42 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-
riae at 19-20, NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984)).
There was no need for the respondents to establish monopoly power in any
precisely defined market for television programming in order to prove the re-
straint unreasonable. Both lower courts found not only the NCAA has power
over the market for intercollegiate sports, but also that in the market for televi-
sion programming-no matter how broadly or narrowly the market is de-
fined-the NCAA television restrictions have reduced output, subverted viewer
choice, and distorted pricing. Consequently, unless the controls have some coun-
tervailing procompetitive justification, they should be deemed unlawful regard-
less of whether petitioner has substantial market power over advertising dol-
lars. . . .And where the anticompetitive effects of conduct can be ascertained
through means short of extensive market analysis, and where no countervailing
competitive virtues are evident, a lengthy analysis of market power is not
necessary.
Id.
127. NCAA, 104 S. Ct. at 2963-64.
128. Serrill, Taking Away the N.C.A.A.'s Ball, TIME MAGAZINE, July 9, 1984, at 77, col.
2.
129. Football Ratings: Lower Ratings Haven't Hurt Profit-ability, BROADCASTING, Nov.
12, 1984, at 55, col. 1.
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network charged "about half the $60,000-plus for 30-second spots
that their NCAA packages commanded in 1983. ' '130 Finally, last
year's college football television menu was a "smorgasbord" for the
viewing public.
131
Although these results would have been the same had the Su-
preme Court applied the per se rule rather than the limited rule of
reason, the Court's emphasis on functional analysis legitimized the
Court's decision while remaining faithful to the Sherman Act's pol-
icy of promoting competition. At least in this college football tele-
vision contest, the Supreme Court has won one for the consumer
rather than for the Gipper.
PETER W. BELLAS*
130. Id. at col. 3.
131. Taafe, A Supremely Unsettling Smorgasbord, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 5, 1984,
at 151; Football Ratings, supra note 129, at 155, col. 1 ("The most common term used to
describe the phenomenon is 'saturation.' ").
* The author would like to thank William P. Bellas for his help in the formulation of
this note.
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